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1 INTRODUCTION
Rising nationalist sentiments are raising political tensions across the world—U.S. President
Donald Trump seeks to “make America great again,” China’s President Xi Jinping calls for
“the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and France’s Emmanuel Macron is trying to
restore France’s glory through his “Jupiterian” presidency, all while a majority of Britain’s
citizens voted to leave the European Union to take back control. In a more globalized world,
political tensions do not necessarily evolve into wars, but rather manifest as a trade dispute.
In other words, political tensions continue in the regime of trade. As such, nationalist
and strong-state narratives create risks for political tensions internationally, which creates
significant uncertainty for global trade. As of October 2020, the trade war between the
Untied States and China has lasted for over two years with no sign that it will end soon—
the political relation between these two countries is quickly deteriorating. In addition,
the quarrel between Australia and China over Hong Kong and the origin of COVID-19
led to China banning barley from Australia’s largest barley exporter in September 2020
(Zhang, 2020). Furthermore, a military confrontation between India and China led to India
banning nearly 200 mobile apps from China. The International Money Fund’s World Trade
Uncertainty Index shows that these political tensions contributed to a recent sharp rise in
trade uncertainty over the past few years after two decades of stability, threatening global
trade and economic growth (Ahir et al., 2019).
Many previous studies analyze the relationship between trade and political tensions (Berger
et al., 2013; Che et al., 2015; Davis andMeunier, 2011; Head et al., 2010; Long, 2008; Michaels
and Zhi, 2010). Davis andMeunier (2011) argue that, theoretically, political tensions should
play a smaller role in a more globalized world; however, several recent empirical studies
(Du et al., 2017; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Heilmann, 2016) show that political tensions
still exert significant negative impacts on trade. There are two critical gaps in the current
literature. First, most previous studies focus on short-term political tensions that last for
days or months, such as consumer boycotts (Heilmann, 2016; Pandya and Venkatesan,
2016). Except for the four-year sanction in Haidar (2017), the periods of political tensions
examined in recent studies are mostly limited to two years at most (Crozet and Hinz, 2020).
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As a result, many existing studies find trade responses to short-term political tensions are
short-lived and sometimes driven solely by firms with stronger governmental ties. Second,
most previous research relies on aggregate trade data to analyze the impact of political
tensions, which masks firm-level trading behavior under political tensions. Recent papers
(Ahn and Ludema, 2020; Crozet and Hinz, 2020; Haidar, 2017) utilize firm-level data to
shed light on the effect of political tensions on individual firm’s behaviors in sanctioned
countries, such as Iran and Russia; however, how political tensions affect firms’ trade
practices and importing portfolio involving products from sanctioned countries remains
unclear.
The objective of this paper is to examine how lasting political tensions impact firms’ trading
behaviors at both the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, we leverage detailed
data on all Chinese seafood importers and importing trips against China’s six-year sanction
of Norwegian salmon products due to bilateral political tensions that started in 2010. Specif-
ically, in October 2010, Norway’s Nobel Committee awarded Chinese political dissident Liu
Xiaobo a Nobel Peace Prize. Within months, China called for more stringent sanitation and
veterinary testing of imports of chilled farmed salmon as a response to this "blasphemy"
(Reuters, 2010). China’s sanction lasted until 2016, when China negotiated a new health
certificate for Norway’s exports of fish products. Firms’ responses to this sanction provide
a unique opportunity to observe how political sanctions change firms’ trading strategies
over a long period. In particular, we explore three main research hypotheses. First, we
hypothesize the sanctions had significant negative impacts on imports of Norwegian fresh
salmon for firms that imported these products before the sanction, which provides an
estimate of the magnitude of the intensive-margin impacts of political sanctions on Norwe-
gian fresh salmon importers. Second, we hypothesize that long-lasting political sanctions
reshape firms’ trading strategies. In our case, impacted firms possibly looked for fresh
salmon from other countries or shifted to other seafood products, depending on whether
the benefit of transition outweighed the costs of not doing so. Importantly, we examine
whether long-lasting political tension made firms strategically diversify their trade port-
folios. Lastly, we hypothesize these intensive and extensive margin responses could vary
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by firm characteristics, with greater responses for firms with better resources and existing
alternative trading routes.
Our main identification strategy is the widely used event study approach (e.g., Allcott
and Rogers (2014); Gallagher (2014); Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2018)) in which we
leverage China’s prompt sanctions following the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize announcement.
We combine this with firm-level data from China Custom Database, which provides price,
value, and source country information for all 74,221 salmon import transactions for China’s
seafood importers from 2007 to 2015. Using firms importing North American shrimp
as the control group, we first quantify the salmon sanction’s intensive-margin impacts
and their persistence over time on the import outcomes of Norwegian fresh salmon for
most affected firms that imported these products before 2010. Second, we examine three
extensive margin outcomes due to the political sanction—the number of countries a firm
imports fresh salmon from, the maximum import share of fresh salmon from any country,
and the import quantity of other seafood products. We expect to see trade diversion effects
as firms actively seek other importing source countries and non-sanctioned substitute
products. In addition, the maximum fresh salmon import share also captures a strategic
diversification effect where political sanctions make firms less likely to solely depend on
any particular country. Finally, we employ a generalized triple difference design to examine
the heterogeneous response across firm characteristics such as firm type, firm size, and
existing trading routes.
The validity of our event study design hinges on the assumption that Norwegian fresh
salmon imports and North American shrimp imports have similar trends absent the sanc-
tion. We provide several pieces of evidence to show that the parallel trends assumption
is satisfied. In addition, we follow Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) to first formally test
for the sample selection bias due to some firms stopping fresh salmon imports altogether
following the 2010 sanction, using the fixed effects two-stage least squares estimator. We
then correct the selection bias using a parametric approach assuming the errors on the
selection equation are normally distributed. Additionally, we provide suggestive evidence
that our results are robust to alternative control groups, potential unobserved shocks,
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and time-varying treatment effects. Finally, we use a partial-equilibrium model of firms’
importing diversification behavior to rationalize our empirical findings.
Our results reveal that China’s importing firms responded to the salmon sanction at both
the extensive and intensive margins. Previous literature (Du et al., 2017; Fuchs and Klann,
2013) mainly focuses on the intensive margin at the national level. In our paper, by utilizing
firm-level data, we are able to do a deeper analysis on the optimal importing behavior
of agents under political tensions. At the intensive margin, firms importing Norwegian
fresh salmon before the sanction saw a consistent and dramatic decline in their imports of
fresh salmon products from Norway ranging from 89% to 96%. Furthermore, the declines
were not short-lived, but instead remained persistent throughout the six-year political
sanction. At the extensive margin, we not only find a trade diversion effect where firms
import from other countries and fewer firms import fresh salmon from Norway, but also a
permanent "political hedging" effect with a decline in the maximum import share from any
particular country, even if it is not Norway. In particular, we find that the maximum share
of seafood a firm imports from any country decreased by 20% on average, especially for
firms with pre-existing alternative trade routes other than Norway. Furthermore, we find a
shift fromNorway dominating import market shares to other countries, especially the Faroe
Islands and the United Kingdom, accounting for more import market share. Furthermore,
we find a greater decline in Norwegian fresh salmon imports for firms that have existing
seafood trading routes other than Norway, but we do not see any significant changes in
Norwegian frozen salmon imports. The firm-level analysis reveals that long-term political
tensions between China and Norway made China’s importers adopt the strategy of import
diversification in order to compromise the negative impacts from a poor long-term bilateral
relationship.
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature on the interplay between trade and
political tensions. First, our work contributes to the extensive literature that examines the
effectiveness of political tensions on trade and economic growth outcomes (Besedeš et al.,
2017; Che et al., 2015; Du et al., 2017; Frankel, 1982; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Heilmann,
2016; Hufbauer et al., 2003; Irwin, 2005; O’rourke, 2007; Pandya and Venkatesan, 2016).
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Previous studies often use datasets aggregated at the national level to investigate the effects
of deteriorating political relations. These studies mainly focus on short-lived political
tensions and conclude that political tensions only have temporary effects on trade (Crozet
and Hinz, 2020; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Heilmann, 2016; Michaels and Zhi, 2010; Pandya
and Venkatesan, 2016). In particular, except for Haidar (2017), which examines the impact
of Iran sanctions from 2008 to 2011 on Iran exports, the political tension period of these
studies ranges from several months to just more than one year. In contrast to the existing
literature, our work looks at the six-year China-Norway political dispute and leverages the
firm level data from China Custom data to examine the effect of the lasting political tension
on bilateral trade outcomes. We show that the long-term political sanction had lasting
and substantial impacts on firms’ imports, a dramatic 89%-96% decline in fresh salmon
imports from Norway, as opposed to the short-lived or muted responses documented in
the literature.
Second, while notably scarcer, there is increasing evidence of the impact of economic
sanctions on firms’ decisions and trade practices (Ahn and Ludema, 2020; Baker et al., 2016;
Bloom, 2009; Crozet and Hinz, 2020; Haidar, 2017; Handley and Limao, 2017; Jia, 2008). In
particular, recent studies have used firm-level data to quantify the effect of sanctions on
Iran or Russia using various economic outcomes. Haidar (2017) focuses on the Western-
imposed sanctions on Iran in 2008 and finds, in the setting of a strict embargo, Iranian
firms had heterogeneous responses to the export sanctions where larger firms were more
likely to divert exports to non-sanctioning countries. In addition, Crozet and Hinz (2020)
finds that exports to Russia saw a steep decline following the sanctions on the Russian
Federation over the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, and the bulk of the decline is actually from
non-embargoed products, reflecting elevated perceived political risk. Both Crozet andHinz
(2020) and Ahn and Ludema (2020) provide evidence that the sanctions have a spillover
effects on non-sanctioned products.
In contrast to these studies, our results indicate a reduction in maximum import share from
any country even if their main importing source country is not affected by the sanction.
This shows that the lasting political sanction resulted in strategic political hedging behavior
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where firms become precautionary and proactively expand their importing partners. To
the best of our knowledge, this outcome has not been examined before the context of
political tensions and trade, and it demonstrates the long-term impact of political tensions
on firms’ trading portfolio and strategies. This is consistent with the findings of our partial-
equilibrium model of firms’ importing diversification behavior where some firms continue
to import from new trading partners even after the Sino-Norway relations unfroze in
2016. In other words, The lasting political tensions has fundamentally changed importers’
diversification strategy and permanently changed the trade patterns with Norway playing
a diminished role. We provide evidence that the Norwegian fresh salmon imports didn’t
fully recover two years after normalization of the bilateral relationship.
Finally, this paper also relates to a strand of literature that investigates the politically
influenced firms’ behavior under political tensions (Du et al., 2017; Heilmann, 2016; Lin
et al., 2019). These studies look at the impact of political tensions on political influenced
firms and find these firms display the higher sensitivity of imports to political relations
relative to other type of firms. In our context, our heterogeneity analysis reveals that not
only politically influenced firms, such as China’s state-owned enterprises adjusted their
trading behavior, but, rather, privately owned firms also became more precautionary and
intentionally diversified their trading portfolios.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide some background on
China’s 2010 decision to impose sanctions on the imports of Norwegian fresh salmon, as
well as China’s fresh salmon trade in general from 2007 to 2015. Section 3 provides details
on the firm-level Chinese Customs data we use in this study. Section 4 presents the event
study approach that we employ to causally identify firm-level responses to the 2010 fresh
salmon sanction at both the intensive and extensive margins. Section 5 provides results on
firm-level responses at the extensive and intensive margin. Finally, we discussed how our
results differ from and improve previous findings and explore the possible mechanisms




A six-year political dispute between China and Norway began with the nomination and
awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (Figure 1). In January, it was leaked that Mr. Liu
Xiaobo, a famous imprisoned Chinese political dissident, was nominated for the Nobel
Peace Prize. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Ma Xiaoxu quickly
responded in February 2020 that awarding Liu would be a "grave mistake". Similarly, in
a visit to Norway in June 2010, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, warned Norway’s
government that awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu would be viewed as "an unfriendly
move towards Beijing" and could deteriorate relations between Oslo and Beijing (Moskwa,
2010). On September 28, 2010, MFA spokesman Jiang Yu explicitly warned that awarding
Liu would "send a wrong message" because Liu is imprisoned for breaking China’s laws.
However, Norway’s Nobel Committee still awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr. Liu
in October 2010, which immediately angered China’s government. Within days, China
summoned Norway’s ambassador and declared the decision a "blasphemy" and insult to
Chinese people (Reuters, 2010), and then cancelled the meeting with Norway’s fisheries
minister (Guardian, 2010).
The political tensions quickly spread to the arena of commerce and trade. As Chen and
Garcia (2016) documents, on December 8, 2010, the Beijing Capital Airport Entry–Exit
Inspection and Quarantine Bureau issued a regional order that required stricter and more
thorough inspection of Norwegian fresh aquaculture products. The Central Office of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China issued document No. 9, on
January 28, 2011, which called for more stringent sanitation and veterinary testing of
imports of chilled farmed salmon. The majority of stakeholders interviewed by Chen and
Garcia (2016) claim that shipments of Norwegian salmon were always checked and that
testing and inspection took longer—at the time, it could take up to 20 days for Norwegian
salmon to clear customs. Salmon from other producing countries were only randomly
checked; and when checked, complete sanitation tests and veterinary inspections only took
three to four days. Norway’s salmon exports to China quickly reflected the effects of these
measures, shrinking 60% in a year that China’s salmon market quickly grew (Godfrey,
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2012).
The China-Norway bilateral relationship was not normalized again until 2016, though
it did go through some ups and downs from 2012 to 2016. In February 2012, Norway
supported China having an observer role as a Non-Arctic State in the Arctic Council (BBC,
2012), to which China responded positively by calling for further "concrete measures" from
Norway to improve the bilateral relations. Despite these thawing signs, in December 2012,
China offered visa-free visits to Beijing for visitors from many European countries other
than Norway (Anderlini and MacCarthy, 2012). Norway made other friendly gestures
toward China starting in 2013 when a new government was elected and Borge Brende, who
reportedly had a direct contact with China’s prime minister, was made Norway’s foreign
minister. In May 2014, Norway’s, government declined to meet the Dalai Lama (Gladstone,
2014), which received praise from China. However, in 2015, Norway’s national security and
intelligence departments accused China of massive cyberattacks and illegal intelligence
collection, rated China as a "threat" alongside Russia, and also expelled a Chinese graduate
student due to national security concerns (Reuters, 2015). All these actions led to slowly
improving, yet stagnant, bilateral political relations.
In September 2014 and March 2015, China banned the imports of whole salmon from
certain regions of Norway over concerns of infectious salmon anaemia (Wright, 2015). In
April 2015, almost one year after Norway’s decision to not meet with the Dalai Lama, China
agreed to accept new proof that Norwegian salmon met international health and safety
standards and thus exports from Norway’s three affected counties could resume using a
new health certificate for fish products (Berglund, 2015). It was not until December 2016
when Norway and China finally resumed and normalized diplomatic and political ties
following a surprise visit by Norway’s foreign minister Brende (Jacobsen and Blanchard,
2016). In April 2017, Norway’s Prime Minister visited China for the first time since 2010
and resumed the bilateral trade talks on a free trade agreement. One month later, China
formally agreed to reopen to Norwegian salmon exports, more than six years after bilateral
relations froze (Jing, 2017; Sina, 2017).
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3 DATA
We use China’s customs data from China Customs Bureau. Data include individual firm’s
trade records and information on imports and exports for each firm, recorded according to
the eight-digit classification (a refined version of the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System (HS) six-digit classification). We define that value for every product
that China imports from other countries as the value of imports China reports arriving
from other countries. We present all price and value data in nominal Chinese yuan, and
we present quantity data in metric tonnes, megawatt-hours, or discrete units (e.g., widgets,
vehicles, etc.), as noted. Unless otherwise noted, we source data in the text and figures
from China Customs Bureau. Data also contain information about import arrival port,
shipment, mode of transport, routing countries, as well as firm characteristics such as firm
type, and location. Our analysis includes approximately 99% of all transactions.
The main dataset contains 74,221 transactions from 6,101 firms at the eight-digit classifi-
cation level of seafood imports from 2007 to 2015. We start with 220 firms that imported
fresh salmon during the study period. From this set, we create two mutually exclusive
subsets—firms that imported Norwegian fresh salmon before 2010, and firms that did not
import Norwegian fresh salmon before 2010 but did import fresh salmon during the study
period.
We first focus on the impact of the salmon sanctions on the 49 firms that imported Nor-
wegian fresh salmon before 2010 (see Table 1 panel A for summary statistics). During
the 2007–2010 period, 22 firms only imported fresh salmon in one year, 14 firms imported
fresh salmon in two of the years, and 13 firms imported fresh salmon at least in three of
the years. Before 2010, each firm had, on average, 4.7 seafood trading routes, 1.41 import
source countries and a 98% maximum import share for any source country. However, after
the salmon sanction, firms’ average number of importing source countries rose to 2.67 and
the maximum import share of any one country dropped to 82%. These 49 firms differ from
one another in ways that are potentially relevant to other seafood import outcomes. The
average seafood share of all imports among these firms is about 61%, while there are about
19 firms in our study with a seafood share below 50% of all imports. Moreover, 47% of
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firms import higher than the average market level and 55% of the firms also import fresh
salmon from other countries.
We next look at the rest of the fresh salmon importing firms. Of these firms, 17 firms
imported fresh salmon from countries other than Norway before 2010 and 158 firms
imported fresh salmon from 2010 to 2015. As shown in Table 1 panel B, on average, 69% of
firms’ imports came from seafood, and each firm had 8.47 seafood trading routes before
2010. The salmon sanction increased the average number of import source countries (from
1.06 to 1.64) and slightly decreased the average maximum import share (from 97% to 91%).
To identify the causal effects of the salmon sanction accurately, we examine a counterfactual
situation in which firms in the seafood industry were unaffected by China’s sanction of
Norwegian fresh salmon. We start with non-fresh seafood firms that did not import any
seafoodproducts fromNorway before 2010. FigureA1 presents the 2007–2010 import trends
of countries that were and were not affected by the salmon sanction across different seafood
products. We restrict our sample to the top seven frozen- or aquatic-product importing
source countries and look for those that have import trends similar to Norwegian fresh
salmon in the years preceding the 2010 salmon sanctions.
As shown in figure A1c, most of the frozen-product importing source countries have a
relatively flat importing trend from 2007 to 2010, while Russia experienced a dramatic
increase in frozen product imports and shows a trend similar trend to Norwegian fresh
salmon imports. As opposed to frozen product imports, aquatic product imports share
a similar trend across the top-seven aquatic-product importing source countries (figure
A1d). Considering that recent boycotts between China and neighboring Asian countries
might affect aquatic product imports, we restrict our sample to North American aquatic
products for our control groups.
We then compare how treated firms and the sub-sample control groups differ across firm
characteristics. In Appendix Table A1, we test for the differential changes before the salmon
sanction. Columns 1–5 show the mean of firm variables in treated firms—North American
shrimp, North American crab, North American other aquatics, and Russian frozen herring.
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We find significant differences exist between treated firms and Russian frozen herring.
Within North American aquatic products, we find restricting the control sample to North
American shrimp helps reduce the magnitude of these differences. Therefore, we keep the
527 firms importing North American aquatic shrimp as our control group. In section 5, we
use other types of firms within our sub-sample to check the robustness of the estimated
coefficients.
Across these 527 firms, 166 firms were in the North American shrimpmarket before China’s
sanction. By 2015, the number of firms in the North American shrimp market increased
to 442. As opposed to firms importing Norwegian fresh salmon, these North American
shrimp firms have large average seafood share (73%) and more seafood trading routes
(5.43). The salmon sanction did not significantly impact the number of import source
countries (from 1.06 to 1.19) as well as the maximum import share (from 96% to 90%).
More detailed information about these categories is available in Table 1.
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1 Intensive-margin impacts on Norwegian fresh salmon imports
In our main empirical analysis, we first study the direct, or intensive-margin, impact of
China’s salmon sanction on Norwegian fresh salmon imports for the treated firms, which
we define as firms importing Norwegian fresh salmon before the 2010 sanction. Between
2007 and 2015, China’s fresh salmon importers made 347 import transactions of fresh
salmon from Norway. For the treated firms, we explore three measures of Norwegian
fresh-salmon import decisions for China’s firms: (a) the value of firm-level imports of
Norwegian fresh salmon; (b) the quantity of firm-level imports of Norwegian fresh salmon;
and, (c) the number of firm-level importing trips involving Norwegian fresh salmon. For
the first two outcomes, we use firms that imported North American fresh shrimp as the




ατ [Dijt,τ ×NFSi] + γi + σpt + εijt (1)
where i indexes China’s import firm; t indexes the year; yijt is a log of import value or
import quantity for import good j for a particular importing trip by firm i in year t; and,
11
NFSi is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i imports Norwegian fresh salmon. For τ > 0,
Dijt,τ equals 1 if it is the τ th year after China’s salmon sanction. For τ < 0, Dijt,τ equals
1 if it is the -τ th year before the salmon sanction. We include the firm fixed effect γi to
absorb time-invariant differences and allow consistent estimation even in the presence of
differences between treated and untreated firms. We further include the port-by-year fixed
effects σpt to control for unobserved common shocks. In our setting, Dit,τ is highly serially
correlated and the default standard errors are likely to be downwards-biased (Arellano
et al., 1987; Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron and Miller, 2015). To address this issue, we use
cluster-robust standard errors, which allows us to assume errors in different years for a
given firm are correlated but errors for different individuals are uncorrelated.
Our main coefficient of interests, ατ , represent the average annual percentage changes in
Norwegian fresh salmon imports τ years following China’s decision to impose sanctions
relative to the event year 0, conditional on all the covariates and fixed effects included
in the regression. These coefficients provide two important pieces of information. First,
they provide a check of Granger causality between the salmon sanction and Norwegian
fresh salmon imports. If the pre-period coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from
zero and have no clear trend, this would provide some reassurance for the identification
assumption. Second, the specification allows us to investigate the dynamic impact of the
salmon sanction over the study period.
The main concern for identification is whether the parallel trends assumption is valid in our
event-study design. In the absence of treatment, treated units should experience the same
trends in average outcomes as the control units. In our context, we want North American
fresh shrimp form a credible counterfactual for the treated firms (Blundell and Dias, 2009)
after accounting for time-invariant (observed and unobserved) differences between firms
and common port-by-year shocks. To check the validity of the identification assumption,
we provide suggestive evidence of no differential pre-trends in import value of Norwegian
fresh salmon relative to the import value of North American shrimp before 2010.
Another concern is whether the difference-in-differences estimates are biased due to a
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sample selection problem. If the firm exit decisions are driven by factors that are systemati-
cally related to the response variable, even after we condition on explanatory variables, the
estimated coefficients would be biased due to a sample selection problem (Semykina and
Wooldridge, 2010; Verbeek and Nijman, 1992; Wooldridge, 1995). As shown in Figures 2
andA2, we not only observe a significant number of firms dropped out from theNorwegian
fresh salmon market after the Norway-China sanction, but also find the treated firms with
high seafood import share or a large number of trading countries are more likely to stay on
the market. To determine whether there is evidence of selection bias due to the sanction,
we define Remaini,t as an indicator that equals to 1 if firm i in year t remains on the market.
We then add (one at a time) Remaini,t−1 and Remaini,t+1 as explanatory variables in the
regression to determine whether there is evidence of selection bias. To preview the results,
we find suggestive evidence of selection bias in our specification.
To correct the potential selection bias, we followprocedure 5.2.1 in Semykina andWooldridge
(2010). In the first stage, we run a probit regression for each time period:
Remaini,t = η1seafoodi,t + η2numi,t + η3seafoodi + η4numi + vi,t (2)
where seafoodi,t is seafood’s share of total imports and numi,t is the number of seafood
trading countries for firm i in year t. In our data, seafood import share and number of
seafood trading countries are not available for each year, thus we construct two variables by
replacing the missing value with zero, as these firm did not import any seafood in the given
years. We also include the average seafood import share seafoodi and number of trading
countries for each firm numi to serve as fixed effects for each firm. Once the coefficients are
estimated, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio, λ̂i,t = λ(η̂1vshi,t + η̂2numi,t + η̂3seafoodi +
η̂4numi)
1.




ατ [Dijt,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + σpt + εijt (3)
1λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio.
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where λ̂i,t is the inverse Mills ratio for firm i in year t and other variables are defined the
same as for equation (1). To estimate the asymptotic variance, we re-sample the firms and
use the bootstrap sample to approximate the distribution of the parameter vector.
Lastly, one might worry that, instead of decreasing the import amount for each trip, firms
might reduce the number of importing trips as a response to this sanction. To examine how
the salmon sanction affected the number of importing trips denoted above, we collapse our
final data into the firm-year level and sum the number of trips for each firm and year over





ατ [Dit,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + ηt + εit (4)
where i indexes China’s import firm; t indexes the year; and, Tripsit is the number of
importing trips across all ports for firm i in year t. Since we aggregate the import data
across all ports, we only include year fixed effects ηt and firm fixed effects γi to control for
all the time-variant determinants and time-invariant determinants specific to firm i. The
estimated robust standard errors are clustered at firm level and the error term εit includes
other determinants of import outcomes. All other variables are defined the same as for
equation (3).
4.2 Extensive-margin impacts
To study firms’ responses along the intensive margin, we investigate the extensive-margin
impacts of the salmon sanction. We ask whether firms would reshape their trading strate-
gies in terms of four measures: (a) other seafood import outcomes, such as other seafood
product imports, fresh salmon total imports, and fresh seafood total imports; (b) the number
of countries importing fresh salmon; (c) the fresh salmon import share of the main source
countries (Norway, Faroe Islands, United Kingdom, and Chile); and, (d) the maximum
import share for any source country.
We first examine the potential trade diversion effects on other seafood products as well
as the sanction’s impact on total fresh salmon and fresh seafood imports. The restriction
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on Norwegian fresh salmon imports could lead to increased imports of other Norwegian
fresh fish species and Norwegian non-fresh salmon imports for treated firms. We examine





ατ [Dijt,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + σpt + εijt (5)
where i index China’s import firm; t indexes the year; Oth indexes other seafood product
imports for treated firms (other Norwegian fresh fish species and Norwegian non-fresh
salmon); and, yOthersijt is a log of import value for import good j per trip for firm i in year t.
We cluster the estimated standard errors at firm level and all other variables are defined
the same as in equation (3).
We then examine how China’s salmon sanction reshaped firms’ import decisions for fresh
salmon or fresh seafood. We use total fresh salmon and total seafood import values as




ατ [Dit,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + ηt + εit (6)
where i indexes China’s import firm; t indexes the year; fish indexes total fresh product
imports for treated firms (fresh salmon and fresh seafood); and, Totalit is the total fresh
product imports for firm i in year t. The estimated robust standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and all other variables are defined the same as in equation (4).
Next, we investigate the impact of China’s salmon sanction on the number of countries
importing fresh salmon after 2010. We calculate the number of importing source countries
by summing the number of countries that a firm imported fresh salmon from by firm and
year. We then use treated firms as a treatment group and North American shrimp firms as




ατ [Dit,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + ηt + εit (7)
where i indexes China’s importing firm; t indexes the year; and, Countriesit is the number
of importing source countries for firm i in year t. The estimate robust standard errors are
clustered at firm level and all other variables are defined the same as in equation (4).
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A closer examination of the import share of fresh salmon for each source country provides
some insight on how firms change their importing sources over the study period. We
focus on the main fresh salmon importing source countries (Norway, Faroe Islands, United
Kingdom, and Chile) and calculate the import shares by firm and year. We then examine





ατ [Dit,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + ηt + εit (8)
where i indexes China’s import firm; t indexes the year; c indexes the main importing
source countries (Norway, Faroe Islands, United Kingdom, and Chile); and, Sharecit is
the import share for firm i in year t from country c. For instance, ShareNorwayit represents
Norway’s import share for firm i in year t. We cluster the estimated robust standard errors
at firm level and all other variables are defined the same as for equation (4).
Lastly, to understand how importers change their trading strategies in the long run, we
explore the changes of themaximum import share for any source country due to the salmon
sanction. We define Sharec,maxit as the maximum import share for any source country for




ατ [Dit,τ ×NFSi] +
∑
t∈[−3,5]
βtλ̂i,t + γi + ηt + εit (9)
where i indexes China’s import firm and t indexes year. We cluster the estimated standard
errors at firm level and all other variables are defined the same as in equation (4).
5 RESULTS
We first present the intensive-margin results by examining the changes in Norwegian fresh
salmon import value relative to North American shrimp import value. We then estimate the
extensive-margin impact by testing how the number of importing source countries, import
shares of individual main source countries, and maximum import share differ among
treated firms relative to our control groups. Lastly, we explore how the heterogeneous
impact of the salmon sanction differed according to firm size, firm ownership structure,
and previous trading history.
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5.1 Intensive-margin impacts on Norwegian fresh salmon imports
Figure 2 shows some suggestive evidence of how treated firms responded to the sanction.
As shown in Figure 2a, between 2007 and 2010, Norwegian fresh salmon imports grew at
an average annual rate of 32%, from 28 million Chinese yuan in 2007 to 86 million Chinese
yuan in 2010; over the same period, little-to-no fresh salmon imports from other countries
suggests that Norway dominated the fresh salmon market before 2010. After Norway’s
Nobel committee awarded Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, China IQB
called for more stringent sanitation and veterinary testing of imports of chilled farmed
salmon, leading to a dramatic drop in Norway imports in 2011. However, the Norwegian
fresh salmon imports readjusted to 2010 levels in 2012. One explanation for this is the price
of Norwegian fresh salmon decreasing in 2012, leading to an increase in Norwegian fresh
salmon imports even with stricter inspections. Inconsistent with this hypothesis, Figure
A4 in the appendix shows that the Norwegian fresh salmon price in 2012 was actually
comparable to 2011 levels and the main fresh salmon importing source countries also
experienced a drop in fresh salmon price. This suggests that a drop in price might not
explain the import increase in 2012.
Another possible reason could be the early 2012 gesture made by Norway’s government
to support China’s application to become a permanent observer of the Arctic Council
provided a positive signal for China’s fresh salmon importers. Anticipating trade relations
would unfreeze, China’s firms increased their salmon import share from Norway in 2012.
However, when China offered visa-free visits to Beijing for Europeans from every country
except Norway in December 2012, China’s firms decreased fresh salmon imports from
Norway and increased fresh salmon imports from other countries, such as Faroe Islands,
United Kingdom, and Chile.
China’s firms may also have shifted from importing fresh salmon to importing frozen
salmon, as the sanction only affected fresh salmon products from Norway. Figure 2b shows
the change in China’s frozen salmon import value by country from 2007 and 2015. We find
no evidence of a spillover effect on Norwegian frozen salmon imports after 2010. Frozen
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salmon imports from other countries did not respond to the sanction, except for Chile,
whose imports increased from 10 million Chinese yuan in 2012 to 70 million Chinese yuan
in 2014. We provide suggestive evidence that Chile’s increase in frozen salmon imports is
highly associated with Chile’s efforts to control salmon diseases from 2007 to 2010.
We also test whether and how the number of firms changed due to the 2010 salmon sanction
to provide descriptive evidence of sample selection issues. Figure 2c presents the number
of firms importing Norwegian fresh salmon and the fresh salmon import changes from
2007 to 2015. To do this, we define treated firms as those firms importing Norwegian fresh
salmon before 2010. We define other firms as those that only imported Norwegian fresh
salmon after China’s sanction. As China issued stricter sanitation tests and veterinary
inspections, we find a significant number of treated firms dropped from the market entirely
with no imports of fresh salmon from any country. This could lead to selection bias when
certain types of importing firms systematically exited from the market. We also find that an
increasing number of other firms entered the fresh salmon market and gained a foothold
due to the salmon sanction. In Figure 2d, we find a significant decrease in the maximum
import share across treated firms. The maximum share decreased to 80% one year after
the salmon sanction, readjusted to 90% in the second year, and then continued decreasing
over the rest of the period.
We then implement event-study specification shown in equation (1) to estimate the intensive-
margin impact of the 2010 sanction on Norwegian fresh salmon import value and quantity
for treated firms (see Figure 3). In the years before the salmon sanction, the coefficients
are all statistically indistinguishable from zero, have modest magnitude, and have no clear
trend. Following the salmon sanction, the import value fell sharply and the average import
deceased by 86% (=e−2.1-1) in value in the first year, relative to the import value of North
American shrimp. In contrast with previous studies that find political tensions only have
temporary effects on trade (Crozet and Hinz, 2020; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Heilmann,
2016; Michaels and Zhi, 2010; Pandya and Venkatesan, 2016), the magnitude and long-run
nature of sanction effects are noteworthy. These effects fluctuate and persist over the next
few years to an almost -99% reduction in Norwegian fresh salmon import value by the
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end of 2015. The results are similar in the case of import quantity. Figure 3c shows no
evidence of a differential trend in import quantity before the sanction. In the first year
after the sanction, the import quantity decreased by 90%; and, five years later, the quantity
decreased by 99%. Table 2 provides additional details.
To formally test for the potential selection bias, we use equation (3) and present results in
Appendix Table B1. Whenwe add the selection indicator in previous years to the regression,
the coefficient on si,t−1 is 0.66 with a robust t statistic of 4.48. When we use si,t+1, we get a
coefficient of 0.399 with t = 3.2. These results suggest that import value in year t is higher
for those in the market in the previous year t − 1, and the decision whether stay in the
market the next year t+ 1 is positively correlated with the salmon sanction. In any case,
we need to correct the selection bias to get an unbiased difference-in-differences estimate.
Figures 3b and 3d present the results of our bias-corrected difference-in-differences esti-
mates. Changes in value of Norwegian fresh salmon imports are slightly smaller or larger
in magnitude and show a persistent downward trend over our study period relative to
the value of North American shrimp imports. The estimated coefficients in the last year of
our study period, roughly -96%, is slightly smaller in magnitude than for the difference-
in-differences estimates we find earlier without accounting for sample selection. Table
3 provides additional details. Since the selection correction approach removes potential
bias from sample selection issues, the estimate change better captures the causal impact
of the salmon sanction. For the rest of this section, we present the corrected difference-in-
differences estimates for both the intensive and extensive margins.
Lastly, we examine how the number of importing trips changed because of the sanction
and present results in Figures 3e and 3f. We find evidence of insignificant negative impacts
of the salmon sanction on the number of trips over our study period. The no differential
pre-trend in the preceding years suggests that the number of transactions before the salmon
sanction are similar between Norwegian fresh salmon imports and North American shrimp
imports. After 2010, we observe evidence of decreases in the number of transactions;
however, the estimated coefficients are insignificantly distinguishable from zero, which
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suggests that treated firms were more likely to decrease their imports for each transactions
rather than decreasing the number of importing trips in response to the salmon sanction.
5.2 Extensive-margin impacts
We first examine the potential trade diversion effect as well as the effect on a firm’s total
fresh salmon imports. We ask whether China’s sanction on Norwegian fresh salmon would
increase the imports of other Norwegian fresh fish species or other Norwegian non-fresh
salmon across the treated firms. Figure 4 presents our results. Different from the findings
in Crozet and Hinz (2020) and Ahn and Ludema (2020) that suggest evidence of sanction
spillovers on non-sanctioned goods, we find little-to-no evidence of differential trends in
imports before the 2010 sanction. We then study how the salmon sanction impacted fresh
salmon imports and fresh seafood imports for fresh-salmon importing firms. As shown in
Figure 4c, despite the treated firms starting to import fresh salmon from countries other
than Norway, we find a large and persistent decrease in the total fresh salmon import
for treated firms, such that, five years later, total imports decreased by 86% relative to
North American shrimp imports. We find some evidence of large decreases in total fresh
seafood imports for treated firms—63% in the first year to 91% in the fifth year, relative to
North American shrimp imports (see Figure 4d). We also examine how other fresh-salmon
importing firms responded to this event. We find little-to-no evidence of increases in the
total fresh salmon imports or total seafood imports (see Figures 4e and 4f).
Figure 5a presents the effect of the salmon sanction on the number of fresh salmon importing
source countries. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals. Reassuringly, we
do not find a differential number of importing source countries in the years preceding the
sanction. Similar with previous study (Haidar, 2017) that suggest sanction would divert
trade to non-sanctioning countries, following the sanction, firms exhibit large increases in
the number of countries they import from. In the first year after the sanction, the number of
fresh salmon importing source countries increased by one versus those of shrimp, relative
to the years before sanction. The sanction shows a persistent effect on the number of fresh
salmon importing source countries, such that the average number is one larger relative to
years before the sanction over the rest of the period. This on average represents a doubling
20
in trading partners from 1.4 before the sanction, predominantly Norway, to 2.7 following
the sanction.
We also find a heterogeneous response to the sanction in terms of the number of fresh
salmon importing source countries across firms with different trading histories. When
we restrict the sample to firms that imported Norwegian fresh salmon alone before 2010
(see Figure 5b), it took two years for these firms to significantly increase the number of
importing source countries, while firms that imported fresh salmon from other countries
before 2010 quickly responded to the sanction by importing from another 1.5 countries
in the first year after the event (see Figure 5c). One potential reason for this is firms that
do not have trading history with other countries need more time to search for alternative
importing sources.
We then examine how the importing source country shares changed due to the salmon
sanction (see Figure 6 for results). We find some evidence of both negative short-run
and long-run relationships between the sanction and China’s imports of Norwegian fresh
salmon. Figure 6a suggests that Norway experienced a 30% drop in China’s import share
in the first year after sanction. The import share readjusted to pre-sanction levels in the
second year due to a positive signal from Norway’s government; however, import share
then continued decreasing over the rest of the period. The decreasing Norway import
share suggests that China’s importers decided to change their trading strategies and shift
their main import source to other countries. Conversely, we find that Faroe Islands is the
biggest winner of the salmon sanction (see Figure 6d). In the first year after the sanction,
Faroe Islands’ share of China’s fresh salmon imports increased 10%, and then increased
20% over the rest of the period. The relationship between sanction and import share of
other countries is also evident (see Figure 6c). We find the United Kingdom experienced
a 20% increase in China’s fresh salmon import share in the first year. In the second year,
the United Kingdom’s share dropped, then gradually increased later. Five years later, the
United Kingdom’s share of Chinese imports had increased by around 20%. Lastly, we find
little-to-no evidence that the sanction increased the import share of fresh salmon from
Chile in the first three years (see Figure 6b). The share of imports from Chile increased to
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30% five years after the sanction, which is likely due to the progress in upgrade talks on
Chile-China Free Trade Agreement with China started in 2015 and 2016.
Finally, we examine how firms changed their long-term importing strategies after the 2010
salmon sanction. We test the maximum importing share changes due to the sanction across
treated firms and present the results in Figure 7. The economic sanction uncertainty might
have an impact on firms’ decisions and lead to more diversified their trading portfolios.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we observe a dramatic drop one year after the sanction and
a gradual decrease over the longer period. A closer examination of firms that only import
fresh salmon from Norway suggests that firms that only imported Norwegian fresh salmon
before 2010 started to switch their importing source country away fromNorway three years
after China’s salmon sanction, consistent with transition difficulty due to having no other
import sources before the sanction (see Figure 7b). The gradual increase in the maximum
import share in the last two years might suggest these firms completely transitioned away
from Norway as a source country. In contrast, in Figure 7c, we observe that firms that had
other trading routes before 2010 quickly responded to the sanction and decreased their
maximum share by 20%. Starting from the third year, these firms readjusted their import
strategies and decreased their import share from Norway to reduce the potential risks.
5.3 Heterogeneous impact of China’s 2010 salmon sanction
Wepresent evidence on theways in which treated firms adjusted in response to the sanction.
We test how sanction impacts differ according to firm size, seafood share of total imports,
the trading routes, and firm type.
We use a generalized triple-difference design to examine heterogeneous responses to the
salmon sanction across different firm characteristics. To use all firms in our dataset, we
construct a balanced panel by assigning a negligible amount of import value for the years
when a firm did not import.2 For ease of interpretation, we implement these tests by
interacting the first term in equation (3) with indicators for firm characteristics. Our main
2This mechanically mean assigning the log import value of fresh salmon and North American shrimp
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βtλ̂i,t + γi + σpt + εijt
where Zj is an indicator function that equals 1 if firm j belongs to a specific group: the
import value of firm j is above the average industry value, or the firm imported salmon
only from Norway, or it is a state-owned enterprise. All other variables are defined the
same as in equation (3).
One hypothesis is that the sanction would have larger impacts on firms with larger seafood
import share. Firms with higher seafood import ratios are more likely to have seafood
trading routes with countries other than Norway, hence they could respond to the sanction
faster and import fresh salmon from other countries. We split firms depending on whether
their seafood import share is above 50%. Table 4 column 2 present our results. We find
that, in the first two years, firms with higher seafood share decreased Norwegian fresh
salmon imports by 73% more relative to firms with low seafood share. The effect continued
expanding—five years later, firms with a higher seafood share imported 83% less fresh
salmon.
We then test whether the salmon sanction had a larger impact on relatively larger firms
or relatively smaller firms. One might think that firms with larger import volume could
bear the switching costs and import fresh salmon from other countries, and therefore,
the sanction would be associated with a larger decrease in import value for large firms
relative to small firms. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 4 column 1 confirms that
these firms are more likely to decrease their imports of Norwegian fresh salmon after 2010.
Zj is defined in equation (10) as an indicator equals 1 if the import value of firm j is above
the average industry value. We find evidence that firms importing higher than average
volumes decreased their Norwegian fresh salmon imports by 63% more relative to firms
with lower import volumes in the first year and by 86% more five years after the sanction.
Next, since we find evidence of late reaction to the salmon sanction among firms that
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imported fresh salmon only from Norway prior to 2010, a natural question is whether these
firms would decrease their Norwegian fresh salmon import volumes less relative to firms
that had trading routes with other countries. The results shown Table 4 column 3 bear this
out. We find evidence of relatively large decreases in Norwegian fresh salmon imports for
firms that imported fresh salmon only from Norway before 2010, which can be explained
by the fact that firms importing fresh salmon from multiple countries could more easily
switch to sources other than Norway.
Finally, we test whether state-owned firms are more likely to adjust their trading behavior
relative to privately owned firms. In contrast with previous literature (Du et al., 2017; Lin
et al., 2019), we find evidence of little-to-no differential response to China’s salmon sanction
across state-owned and private-owned firms (see Table 4 column 4). This result suggests
that not only politically influenced firms, such as China’s state-owned enterprises adjusted
their trading behavior, but, rather, privately owned firms also became more precautionary
and intentionally diversified their trading portfolios. Taken together, we conclude that the
sanction had dramatic impacts on firms with large import values, higher seafood import
share, and more fresh salmon trading routes but no differential impact across different
firm types. Notably, we find that significant importing responses for both private and
state-owned enterprises, which is in contrast with the previous findings of only responses
from politically influenced firms such as state-owned enterprises.
6 DISCUSSIONS AND A PARTIAL-EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATION
6.1 Threats to identification and robustness checks
We test the robustness of our event-study results presented in section 5. We first discuss
whether the treatment effect varies across different timing, and we then run placebo tests
to examine any potential unobserved shocks in 2010. Lastly, we test whether the estimated
coefficients would be biased if we used alternative control groups.
First, recent papers by Roth (2018) and Goodman-Bacon (2018) discuss the potential biases
of estimating the average treatment effects when the effects change over time. In our
case, there are two orders issued by China IQB (December 2010 and January 2011) calling
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for more stringent sanitation and veterinary testing of Norwegian fresh salmon imports.
However, given that importing firms knew about the nomination in January 2010, and both
IQB actions happened around the end of 2010, the chances that the treatment effect would
vary much are pretty small; therefore, we treat these two events as one policy treatment to
examine its impact on Norwegian fresh salmon imports.
Second, another potential threat to the internal validity of the study is that there might
be other shocks that both affect the seafood imports and occur concurrently with, or just
after, China’s salmon sanction began. To investigate this, we estimate regressions similar to
equation (3) but replace the dependent variable with other seafood product import values
from unaffected firms that have never imported any type of salmon before 2010. If there are
any shocks that affect the seafood imports, then we would expect some evidence of import
changes after 2010. Figure B1 presents the event-study results for other seafood imports
from unaffected firms. Overall, we find little-to-no evidence that the salmon sanction had
any impact on other seafood imports from unaffected firms. These results suggests there
were no other factors influencing the seafood import values at the time of the salmon
sanction.
In addition, to explore the sensitivity of our results, we construct several alternative control
groups by exploiting different firm configurations among seafood importers, including
firms that import Asian fresh shrimp, North American crab, and Russian frozen herring.
We also use different seafood imports within the treated firms as controls to examine
the robustness of our results. First, we examine whether firms importing other seafood
products from other countries experienced different unobserved shocks that might affect
their importing outcomes. We provide evidence to alleviate this concern in Figure B2. As
Figure B2a shows, using Asian shrimp as a control does not lead to appreciable changes
in the estimated coefficients—except for 2013 when differential imports readjusted back
to almost zero. The readjustment might be partially explained by the boycotts between
China and other Asian countries over our study period. We also use firms importing
Asian and North American shrimp as controls (see Figure B2b). The estimated coefficients
show similar trend to estimated coefficients using North American shrimp. We use other
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seafood products such as North American crab and Russian frozen herring as controls—the
estimated coefficients are similar to those in our baseline results. Lastly, we use other fish
products imported by treated firms as controls to test if our estimates are explained by the
contrast to other seafood firms or by other seafood products within the same firms. We
find similar estimates across different samples (see Figure B3).
We also test for the sensitivity of our results by using an alternative definition of treated
firms and control firms. In particular, we define the alternative treated firms as firms
importing fresh salmon from any country before 2010 and define the alternative control
group as firms importing North American shrimp before 2010 to see how the estimated
coefficients change. We find similar estimates using the alternative control group, while the
coefficients are slightly larger using the alternative treatment group (see Figure B4). Overall,
these alternate specifications corroborate the suitability of our event-study specification to
estimate the effects of interest.
6.2 Import diversification and emerging explanation
We develop a partial-equilibrium model of firms’ importing behavior to rationalize our
empirical findings. As suggested in Haveman and Hummels (2004), countries tend to
import from few exporters—58% of importers purchase from around 10% of available
exporters. We do find that China’s salmon importers decreased their purchases from
Norway and expanded their sourcing countries under the long-term bilateral political
tension. China’s importers chose to take an import diversification strategy when facing
political risks. As Wolak and Kolstad (1991) and Muhammad (2012) argue, one reason
that firms do diversify imports is to control price uncertainty of the sourcing countries. In
the spirit of Antras et al. (2017)—firms pay a fixed cost to improve their efficiency—we
build a simplified model to understand firms’ behavior under political tensions. Firms can
add a new import country by paying a one-time fixed cost, which can potentially improve
their efficiency of production by importing from multiple sources. Thus, firms face trading
higher efficiency for a higher fixed cost of importing.
In our simplified model, firms face a declining demand curve for salmon and salmon
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from Norway and other countries are perfect substitutes. Because of the growing season
of salmon, it is reasonable to assume the production process is not evenly distributed
throughout the year, and we assume the cost function C is convex (Ahn and McQuoid,
2017). Similar to Antras et al. (2017), the demand curve takes the form of Qd = BP−σ or
P = B(Qd)−1/σ with σ being greater than one because of the elastic demand for salmon in
China (Chen and Garcia, 2016; Zhuang and Abbott, 2007).3 Prior to the political tension,
China imported virtually all of its salmon from Norway. The present value of profit of a








where Sn,t represents salmon imported from Norway; P is the price function; and, τn,l
represents the normal tariff equivalent of trade barriers on imports from Norway before
the political tension.







[p(Sn,t + So,t)(Sn,t + So)− τn,lC(Sn,t)− τoC(So,t)]− Fo (12)
where So,t represents salmon from other countries; P is the price function; and, τo represents
the tariff equivalent of trade barriers on imports from other countries.
However, because of the political tensions, firms realize there will be a higher trade barrier
importing from Norway that lasts for T periods; thus, the profit of importing only from




























[p(Sn,t + So,t)(Sn,t + So)− τn,lC(Sn,t)− τoC(So,t)]− Fo
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(14)
where τn,h represents the higher trade barriers for Norway that last for T periods because
of the political tensions.
For simplicity, assuming firms are facing exactly the same demand function each period, we
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S2n,l if t > T
(16)
Using the envelop theorem, we can get the following first-order conditions that explain the













ln(1 + r)(1 + r)−T
r
[C(S1n,h)− C(S2n,h)] (19)
Obviously, the first condition with respect to Fo is negative, meaning that higher fixed cost
to find another supplier would erode the profit gain from sourcing from another exporter.
The signs of the remaining two conditions depend on the sign of the cost differential
C(S1n,h) − C(S2n,h). We could show that this cost differential is positive and prove that
S1n,h > S
2
n,h using proof by contradiction, since firms will choose to expand sourcing
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countries if π∗2 > π∗1 . Because firms maximize profit, we know that, in equilibrium, the
marginal cost of importing an additional unit of salmon must always equal the marginal
revenue of it. Assume that S1n,h ≤ S2n,h, which suggests that under the multiple sourcing
scenario the firm imports more quantity from Norway and buys from another country.
Because of the convexity of cost function, themarginal cost of themultiple sourcing scenario
with higher import quantity would be higher than that of importing only from Norway.
This implies the marginal revenue of multiple sourcing is also higher than that of importing
only from Norway. However, we know the cost function is convex with C ′(0) < C ′(S2n,h)—






This implies a higher importing quantity of salmon in the multiple outsourcing scenario,
for which, according to the elastic demand, the marginal revenue should be lower. Thus,
our assumption of S1n,h ≤ S2n,h must be wrong,and S1n,h > S2n,h is proven.










The last two conditions suggest that a prolonged political tension, a higher T , or a rise
in tariff-equivalent trade barrier τn,h − τn,l, would increase the profit gain resulting from
sourcing from another country, which provides an incentive for firms to expand their
sourcing countries and engage in import diversification. In thismodel, the tensions between
Norway and China will raise the tariff equivalent of trade barriers τn,h, which last for T
periods. Both factors in this lasting political tension between China and Norway can
generate enough space to allow firms to change trading strategies. In other words, whether
a firm implements import diversification depends on how severely the political tension
raises the cost and how long the tension lasts. Our finding of much larger trade responses
for this long-term political tension is consistent with this theoretical result.
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Intuitively, the only cost of using an import diversification strategy is the additional fixed
cost to establish a new trading route. Once firms pay the fixed cost, they can reduce their
average cost of production by using multiple inputs. This means that even after the political
tensions, firms that have paid the fixed cost to establish another trading route do not have
to incur that cost again, and some of them will continue to import from these new partners.
This might explain our finding of the political hedging effect via the reduction in maximum
share of fresh salmon imports from any country.
Finally, note that if we do not include fixed cost in the profit function, π2 ≥ π1 will always
hold, as long as τo does not exceed τn,h too much. As a result, the Norway exporters that
once dominated the market could not retain that market share once China’s importers ac-
cessed salmon from other countries. Once implemented, the import diversification strategy
permanently changed the trade pattern. In the aggregate data, we see that Norwegian
salmon had not restored its share in China’s fresh salmon market even two years after the
bilateral relationship normalized.
7 CONCLUSION
The political tensions between Norway and China following the award of the Nobel Peace
Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo resulted in a frozen bilateral relationship and an
effective Norwegian fresh salmon sanction that lasted for over six years. Taking advantage
of this long-termpolitical sanction and leveraging firm-level data from all of China’s seafood
importers from 2007 to 2015, we provide evidence that these firms adapted their imports
to this political sanction at both the intensive and extensive margin. Firms that imported
Norwegian fresh salmon before 2010 saw a dramatic 89%-96% decline in fresh salmon
imports fromNorway; and, in contrast with previous findings, this effect is persistent rather
than short-lived. We also find that as firms expanded trading routes and imports from
countries other than Norway, they became more precautionary and lowered the maximum
share of fresh salmon imports from any country, even if not Norway. Furthermore, unlike
the findings in most consumer boycotts studies, we find that both politically influenced
firms, such as China’s state-owned enterprises, and privately owned enterprises adjusted
their trading behavior and diversified their trade portfolios. Our heterogeneity analysis
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also suggests that China’s dramatic decrease in Norwegian fresh salmon imports were
driven by large import reductions in firms with large import value, higher seafood import
share, and more fresh salmon trading routes.
There are several limitations to our analysis. First, we cannot pinpoint the month of
the importing trips, thus our annual data cannot uncover the dynamic and immediate
responses following major events that may have further deteriorated or improved Norway-
China relations. Second, our customs database contains a wealth of information on firms’
import prices and quantities; however, it does not contain many firm characteristics, such
as number of employees. We augment customs data with an auxiliary firm-level database
that identifies firm ownership structure through database name searches using Tianyacha,
a commercial Chinese firm database. We were able to match most, but not all, firms. We
also use the value of firms’ total imports as proxies for firm size. Finally, our data ended in
2015, which is before the normalization of China-Norway political relations, and we are
unable to examine the persistence of these extensive- and intensive-margin effects after the
six-year-long political tensions. We provided some suggestive evidence using aggregate
monthly trade data that firms do not return to the pre-sanction import portfolio dominated
by Norway.
Our paper has important implications in understanding the consequences of politically
motivated trade policies. Our results show that the political sanctions on Norwegian fresh
salmon imports led to a persistent shift in the fresh salmon market where competitors,
such as Faroe Islands, Chile, and United Kingdom captured Norway’s market share. This
transition is costly for Norwegian fresh salmon firms—they experienced an average loss of
36.8 million Chinese Yuan following the sanction as compared to unaffected control firms.4
4For this calculation, we re-estimate equation (3) but assume all the time indicators equal to 1 if firms
import goods after 2010. We use the log of import value of Norwegian fresh salmon or fresh salmon from
any other source country as the dependent variable for treatment group. We multiply the relevant coefficient
by the average fresh salmon import value before 2010 to get the average value reduction in Norwegian fresh
salmon imports and average value gain in fresh salmon import from any other source country. We calculate
the average loss by subtracting the average gain in fresh salmon import from any other source country from
the average value reduction in Norwegian fresh salmon imports.
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The persistent loss of Norway exports and the political hedging effect revealed through the
lower maximum share of imports reveal that a significant degree of the loss due to this
disruption is permanent. Finally, our heterogeneity analysis shows that this sanction hurts
smaller firms more due to their lack of resources to build and expand on other trading
routes.
Our paper suggests several fruitful avenues for future research. This is especially meaning-
ful for the current world as political risks are rising globally. First, our findings of persistent
trade responses to political sanctions contrast much of the previous literature, which calls
for more analysis of consequential political disruptions of trade relationships, such as the
ongoing U.S.-China trade war, as opposed to short-lived events like consumer boycotts.
Second, due to data limitations, we cannot assess how firms’ profits were impacted due
to China’s political sanction. With more detailed firm-level data, we could understand
more of the mechanisms behind the behaviors of Norwegian fresh salmon firms during
China’s salmon sanction. Finally, it will also be worthwhile to examine how exporters from
Norway to Chile coped with this significant trade disruption.
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TABLES
Table 1. Summary Statistics of China’s Seafood Importers
Firms N Mean S.D. Median
Firms Importing Norwegian Fresh Salmon
before 2010 (Treated Firms)
Import Value 49 347 1,967,928 4,208,354 459,659
Import Quantity 49 347 251,564 533,907 56,929
Total Value 49 176 3,879,950 7,508,449 1,017,206
Seafood Share of All Imports 49 49 .65 .44 .93
No. of Seafood Trading Routes before 2010 49 49 4.70 7.64 4
No. of Import Source Countries
Before 2010 49 101 1.41 .79 1
After 2010 27 75 2.67 1.66 2
Maximum Import Share for Any Source
Country
Before 2010 49 101 .98 .06 1
After 2010 27 75 .82 .20 .89
Firms Importing North American Shrimp
(Control Firms)
Import Value 527 1,582 769,086 1,883,375 192,948
Import Quantity 527 1,582 106,822 306,247 13,890
Total Value 527 1,116 1,090,228 2,830,810 245,034
Seafood Share of All Imports 527 527 .75 .37 .97
No. of Seafood Trading Routes before 2010 166 166 5.43 13.20 7
No. of Import Source Countries
Before 2010 166 284 1.06 .24 1
After 2010 442 832 1.19 .39 1
Maximum Import Share for Any Source
Country
Before 2010 166 284 .96 .11 1
After 2010 442 832 .90 .17 1
Notes: Table 1 presents the number of firms, observation, means, standard deviations and
medians. The upper panel presents raw summary statistics for the sample of firms import-
ing Norwegian fresh salmon before 2010. The lower panel presents raw summary statistics
for the sample of firms importing North American shrimps. Our study period is from 2007
to 2015.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of China’s Seafood Importers (Contin-
ued)
Firms N Mean S.D. Median
All Seafood Importers (Full Sample)
Imports Value 6,101 74,221 588,315 2,236,063 89,411
Import Quantity 6,101 74,221 295,138 1,483,840 38,000
Total Value 6,101 29,108 5,263,792 1.50e+07 618747
Seafood Share of All Imports 6,101 6,101 .58 .44 .82
No. of Seafood Trading Routes before 2010 3,260 3,260 5.93 8.41 2
No. of Import Source Countries
Before 2010 3,260 6,498 2.81 3.28 1
After 2010 4,323 9,359 2.66 3.02 1
Maximum Import Share for Any Source
Country
Before 2010 3,260 6,498 .75 .26 .81
After 2010 4,323 9,359 .76 .26 .84
Firms Importing Fresh Salmon fromCoun-
tries other than Norway before the Sanc-
tion (Alternative Control Firms)
Import Value 171 458 955,595 1,817,125 247,261
Import Quantity 171 458 112,843 216,563 29,762
Total Value 171 282 1,551,996 3,187,835 348,753
Seafood Share of All Imports 171 171 .69 .42 .99
No. of Seafood Trading Routes before 2010 17 17 8.47 9.05 6
No. of Import Source Countries
Before 2010 17 17 1.06 .24 1
After 2010 158 265 1.64 1.15 1
Maximum Import Share for Any Source
Country
Before 2010 17 17 .97 .12 1
After 2010 158 265 .91 .18 1
Notes: Table 1 presents the number of firms, observation, means, standard deviations
and medians. The upper panel presents raw summary statistics for the sample of firms in
seafood industry. The lower panel presents raw summary statistics for the sample of other
fresh salmon firms that didn’t import Norwegian fresh salmon before 2010. Our study pe-
riod is from 2007 to 2015.
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Table 2. Intensive-margin Impacts of China’s








3 years before event -1.418 -1.461 -.024
(1.456) (1.467) (.024)
2 years before event .001 -.010 -.025
(.535) (.568) (.025)
1 year before event .307 .327 -.022
(.398) (.400) (.021)
Year of event
1 year after event -2.317*** -2.314*** -.042
(.554) (.550) (.041)
2 years after event -1.739*** -1.476*** -.055
(.575) (.568) (.053)
3 years after event -3.122*** -3.102*** -.028
(.700) (.664) (.027)
4 years after event -2.826*** -2.843*** -.027
(.647) (.649) (.027)
5 years after event -3.907*** -3.696*** -.028
(.710) (.687) (.027)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Port-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,496 1,496 989
N (firms) 567 567 567
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.61 0.47
Notes: Table 2 presents our event study estimators from equa-
tions (1) three years before and five years after China’s Norwegian
salmon sanction. Standard errors are clustered by firms. Regres-
sions (1)–(2) include firm fixed effects and port-by-year fixed
effects, except where otherwise noted. Regressions (3) only in-
clude firm fixed effects. Data cover the years 2007–2015. Asterisks
denote p-value < 0.10 (*), < 0.05 (**), or < 0.01 (***).
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Table 3. Selection Bias-Corrected Intensive-








3 years before event -1.439 -1.488 .056
(1.477) (1.509) (.104)
2 years before event -.008 -.083 .074
(.562) (.589) (.097)
1 year before event .300 .333 -.045
(.416) (.429) (.090)
Year of event
1 year after event -2.228*** -2.228*** -.012
(.545) (.540) (.092)
2 years after event -1.853*** -1.600*** -.191**
(.584) (.576) (.090)
3 years after event -2.921*** -2.918*** -.025
(.736) (.706) (.094)
4 years after event -2.623*** -2.641*** -.005
(.644) (.656) (.101)
5 years after event -3.456*** -3.246*** .005
(.709) (.736) (.181)
λ̂i,2007 -.413 -.831 -.340***
(.537) (.700) (.081)
λ̂i,2008 -.162 -.767 -.353***
(.610) (.794) (.084)
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Table 3. Selection Bias-Corrected IntensiveMar-








λ̂i,2009 -.050 .089 -.263***
(.413) (.567) (.099)
λ̂i,2010 -1.094*** -1.039** -.356***
(.386) (.480) (.094)
λ̂i,2011 -.668 -.565 -.474***
(.474) (.464) (.109)
λ̂i,2012 -.892* -.817 -.309***
(.486) (.505) (.124)
λ̂i,2013 -1.275*** -1.274*** -.452***
(.474) (.469) (.130)
λ̂i,2014 -.440 -.458 -.471***
(.355) (.316) (.125)
λ̂i,2015 -1.164** -1.195** -.638***
(.584) (.566) (.184)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Port-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,496 1,496 989
N (firms) 567 567 567
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.62 0.51
Notes: Table 3 presents our event study and inverse mills ratio
estimators from equations (3) three years before and five years
after China’s Norwegian salmon sanction. Standard errors are
clustered by firms. Regressions (1)–(2) include firm fixed effects
and port-by-year fixed effects, except where otherwise noted. Re-
gressions (3) only include firm fixed effects. Data cover the years
2007–2015. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), < 0.05 (**), or <
0.01 (***).
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Table 4. Heterogeneous Impacts of China’s 2010 Salmon Sanction
(1) Seafood Im-










3 years before event -1.904** -1.865** -1.125 .648
(.750) (.735) (.774) (1.792)
2 years before event -1.707*** -.758 -.615 1.712
(.539) (.614) (.574) (.846)
1 year before event -.690 -.102 -.413 .701
(.608) (.594) (.555) (.432)
Year of event
1 year after event -.826 -.998* -.594 -.496
(.572) (.559) (.504) (.886)
2 years after event -1.314*** -.998* -.988** -.126
(.496) (.533) (.480) (.910)
3 years after event -1.596*** -1.229** -.878* .104
(.534) (.595) (.533) (.934)
4 years after event -1.593*** -1.439*** -1.391*** .158
(.514) (.553) (.498) (.927)
5 years after event -1.755*** -2.005*** -1.624*** .407
(.550) (.550) (.515) (.933)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Port-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,648 5,648 5,648 5,648
N (firms) 567 567 567 567
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Notes: Table 4 presents our event study estimators from equation (10) three years before and five years
after the Norwegian salmon sanction. Standard errors are clustered by firms. Regressions include firm
fixed effects and port-by-year fixed effects, except where otherwise noted. See text for details. Data
cover the years 2007–2015. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), < 0.05 (**), or < 0.01 (***).
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FIGURES
Figure 1. Timeline of China-Norway Fresh Salmon Trade Disruptions (2010–2017)
Notes: Figure 1 plots the 2010–2017 monthly Norwegian fresh salmon imports obtained from UN Comtrade. Given UN Comtrade only
provides annual data from 2013 to 2015, we evenly distribute the annual imports to each month for the 2013–2015 period.
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Figure 2. Total Imports and Number of China of Firms For All Chinese
Salmon Importers (2007–2015)
(a) Total Value of China’s Fresh Salmon
Imports
(b) Total Value of China’s Frozen Salmon
Imports
(c) Number of Firms Importing Norwegian
Fresh Salmon
(d) Average Maximum Import Share from
Any Source Country
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Figure 3. Event Study Estimate Results of the Intensive-margin Impacts
on Norwegian Fresh Salmon Imports by Treated Firms
(a) Log Value of Imports (uncorrected) (b) Log Value of Imports (corrected)
(c) Log Quantity of Imports (uncor-
rected)
(d) Log Quantity of Imports (corrected)
(e) Number of Transactions (uncor-
rected)
(f) Number of Transactions (corrected)
Notes: Figure 2 shows the results of event-study estimates from equations (1) and (3)
in which the dependent variables are import value, import quantity, and the number of
transaction for each firm. The control group is firms that imported North American shrimp
from 2007 to 2015. 46
Figure 4. Trade Diversion Impacts and Total Fresh Salmon and Seafood
Impacts
(a) Norwegian Frozen Salmon Imports (b) Other Norwegian Fresh Fish Imports
(c) Total Fresh Salmon Imports for Treated
Firms
(d) Total Seafood Imports for Treated
Firms
(e) Total Fresh Salmon Imports for Con-
trol Firms
(f) Total Seafood Imports for Control
Firms
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Figure 5. Extensive-margin Impacts on the Number of Trading Partners
and Maximum Share Imported from Any Country
(a) Number of Countries Firms Im-
ported Fresh Salmon From
(b) Number of Countries Firms
Import Fresh Salmon From (Only
Import from Norway)
(c) Number of Countries Firms Import
Fresh Salmon From (Import from
Norway and Other Countries)
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Figure 6. Extensive-margin Impacts on Fresh Salmon Import Share by
Source Countries
(a) Norway (b) Chile
(c) United Kingdom (d) Faroe Islands
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Figure 7. Extensive-margin Impacts of Number of Trading Partners and
Maximum Share Imported from Any Country
(a) Maximum Fresh Salmon Import
Share for Any Source Country
(b) Maximum Fresh Salmon Import
Share for Any Source Country (Only
Import from Norway)
(c) Maximum Fresh Salmon Import
Share for Any Source Country (Import
from Norway and Other Countries)
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Online Appendix A ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

















Seafood Share of All Imports .65 .75 .79 .73 .86
Number of Seafood Trading
Routes
4.70 5.43 6.11 4.30 5.35
State-owned .12 .08 .09 .11 .16
Transport by Sea .57 .63 .62 .60 .62
Maximum Import Share .98 .90 .78 .82 .89
Notes: Table A1 presents the firm characteristics of treatment and alternative control groups from
2007 to 2010.
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Figure A1. Import Value Trend of Seafood Products
(a) Fresh Salmon (Treated Firms) (b) Russian Frozen Fishes
(Control Groups)
(c) Frozen Fishes (Control Groups) (d) Aquatics (Control Groups)
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Figure A2. Change in the Number of Norwegian Fresh Salmon Firms
(a) Seafood Share of All Imports (b) Seafood Import Value Above Average
(c) Number of Trading Countries Above
Average
(d) State-Owned vs. Privately Owned
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Figure A3. Characteristic Comparison of Entering and Exiting Firms
(a) Seafood Share of All Imports (b) Number of Trading Countries
(c) State-owned Ratio (d) Large Firm Ratio
FigureA4. AveragePriceTrends in FreshSalmon Imports inMainSource
Countries
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Online Appendix B ROBUSTNESS CHECKS






3 years before event -1.593
(1.507)
2 years before event -.012 -.181
(.554) (.534)
1 year before event .524 .009
(.401) (.392)
Year of event
1 year after event -2.191*** -2.215***
(.571) (.530)
2 years after event -1.312** -1.718***
(.565) (.562)
3 years after event -2.697*** -3.177***
(.686) (.669)
4 years after event -2.421*** -2.589***
(.644) (.672)
5 years after event -3.436***
(.746)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Port-by-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,417 1,247
N (firms) 567 567
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.50
Notes: Table B1 presents our event study estimators adding selec-
tion indicators three years before and five years after the Norwe-
gian salmon disruption following equation (1). Standard errors are
clustered by firms. Regressions include firm fixed effects and port-
by-year fixed effects, except where otherwise noted. Data covers
the years 2007–2015. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), < 0.05
(**), or < 0.01 (***).
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Table B2. Selection Bias-Corrected Intensive-margin Impacts: First Stage Estimates
Remaini,t 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
seafoodi -1.536*** -1.827*** -1.357*** -1.363*** -1.879*** -1.462*** -1.414*** -1.509*** -1.351***
(.358) (.423) (.334) (.356) (.454) (.314) (.372) (.367) (.325)
numi -.175*** -.099*** -.229*** -.157*** -.160*** -.133*** -.120*** -.238*** -.154***
(.039) (.038) (.044) (.041) (.040) (.029) (.032) (.038) (.028)
seafoodi,t 2.267*** 2.438*** 2.109*** 2.028*** 2.743*** 2.073*** 2.267*** 2.433*** 2.127***
(.338) (.387) (.298) (.315) (.417) (.278) (.339) (.332) (.291)
numi,t .148*** .099*** .185*** .180*** .162*** .183*** .187*** .257*** .256***
(.033) (.032) (.038) (.035) (.033) (.028) (.031) (.034) (.031)
Observations 592 587 591 597 620 659 663 682 660
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.46
Notes: Table B2 presents our probit estimators from equation (2) from 2007 to 2015 using the binary indicator
Remaini,t as the dependent variable denoting that firm i is still importing fresh salmon in year t. Asterisks denote
p-value < 0.10 (*), < 0.05 (**), or < 0.01 (***).
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Figure B1. Placebo Tests of the Sanction’s Impact onOther Seafood Prod-
ucts from Unaffected Firms
(a) Treatment: Frozen Cod (b) Treatment: Frozen Europe Plaice
(c) Treatment: Frozen Hairtail (d) Treatment: Frozen Flounder
58
Figure B2. Direct Impacts of China’s 2010 Salmon Sanction using Alter-
native Control Firms
(a) Control: Firms Importing Asian Shrimp (b) Control: Firms Importing North
American and Asian Shrimp
(c) Control: Firms Importing North
American Crab
(d) Control: Firms Importing Russian
Frozen Herring
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Figure B3. Direct Impacts of China’s 2010 Salmon Sanction using Alter-
native Seafood Product Importing Firms as Controls
(a) Control: Firms Importing Fresh Salmon
not from Norway
(b) Control: Firms Importing Norwegian
Non-fresh Fishes other than Salmon
(c) Control: Firms Importing Frozen Fishes
other than Salmon and not from Norway
(d) Control: Firms Importing Aquatic
Fishes other than Salmon and not from
Norway
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Figure B4. Direct Impacts of China’s 2010 Salmon Sanction using Alter-
native Treatment or Control Definition
(a) Control: Firms Importing North American Shrimp before
2010
(b) Treatment: Firms Importing Fresh Salmon before 2010
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